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EXPEDIENT AND MONOTONE LEARNING RULES
BY TILMAN BÖRGERS,A NTONIO J. MORALES, AND RAJIV SARIN1
This paper considers learning rules for environments in which little prior and feed-
back information is available to the decision maker. Two properties of such learning
rules are studied: absolute expediency and monotonicity. Both require that some as-
pect of the decision maker’sperformance improves from the currentperiod to the next.
The paper provides some necessary, and some sufﬁcient conditions for these proper-
ties. It turns out that there is a large variety of learning rules that have the properties.
However, all learning rules that have these properties are related to the replicator dy-
namics of evolutionary game theory. For the case in which there are only two actions,
it is shown that one of the absolutely expedient learning rules dominates all others.
KEYWORDS: Learning, monotonicity, absolute expediency, replicator dynamics,
bounded rationality.
1. INTRODUCTION
WE ARRIVE AT MOST ECONOMIC DECISIONS of our lives through a learning
process in which we adjust our behavior in response to experience. For exam-
ple, we learn in this way which consumption goods we like, how to invest our
money, and how to behave towards colleagues at work. For economic theory it
is thereforeinteresting to exploremathematicalmodelsoflearning.Fudenberg
and Levine (1998) have surveyed the large literature on this subject.
A problem is that a large variety of learning models exists, and that it is of-
ten not clear on which grounds to choose one model rather than another. If
much prior and feedback information is available, then a Bayesian model with
a limited state space might seem plausible. But if the prior and feedback infor-
mation are very incomplete, then the set of conceivable states of the world is
so large, and the basis on which the decision maker can update beliefs so small,
that Bayesian models seem less plausible. Once one turns away from Bayesian
learning models, it is difﬁcult to see which learning models one should study.
This paper suggests that a useful way of proceeding is to investigate gen-
eral properties of learning rules. We consider a large class of learning models
that encompasses almost all learning models in which the only feedback infor-
mation used by the decision maker is his own payoff. We investigate which of
these models have a property labelled “absolute expediency.” We also explore
1We are grateful to an editor, and to Jeff Ely, Drew Fudenberg, and several anonymous refer-
eesforveryhelpfulcomments.Aﬁrstversion ofsomepartsofthispaperwasachapterinMorales’
Ph.D. thesis at University College London, and was circulated in 1998 in a paper entitled “Simple
Behaviour Rules Which Lead to Expected Payoff Maximising Choices.” The authors thank the
following for ﬁnancial support: Economic and Social Research Council (UK) through the Centre
for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) (Tilman Börgers); centrA and the Bank of
Spain (Antonio J. Morales); the Program to Enhance Scholarly and Creative Activities and the
Bush Program in Policy Research at Texas A&M University (Rajiv Sarin).
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a closely related property, “monotonicity.” Both properties refer to the deci-
sion maker’s observable behavior only, not his beliefs or thoughts. Learning
rules have these properties if the performance of a decision maker using the
learning rules improves from the current period to the next, provided that the
environment stays the same. When considering absolute expediency, the per-
formance measure is expected payoffs. When considering monotonicity, the
performance measure is the expected probability with which the strategy that
maximizes expected payoffs is played. The properties require performance im-
provement in every environment in a very large class of environments.
Why are we interested in these properties? In everyday life, we often speak
of the “learning curve” which describes the change in behavior when re-
peatedly facing a given task. Implicit is the idea that the learning decision
maker gradually, but monotonically moves towards better choices. In envi-
ronments that are subject to random shocks, one cannot expect that people
learn monotonically with probability 1. A weaker property is that they learn
monotonically in expected terms. We study learning algorithms with this fea-
ture, where we only focus on whether monotonic learning happens in expected
terms from the ﬁrst period to the next. This seems a simple and natural crite-
rion for classifying learning schemes.
In some situations the properties that we study may be desirable. Suppose
the decision maker has no information about the environment that prevails to-
day, but he thinks that the environment is likely to stay unchanged in the short-
run,thoughnotinthelong-run.Itthenseems plausiblethatthe decisionmaker
focuses on the short-run. Our assumption that the decision maker only thinks
about the next period is an extreme form of myopia which we assume here
for simplicity. The decision maker’s focus on improvement is psychologically
plausible. Introspection suggests that the present often serves as a status quo,
and that a person’s focus is on not letting it deteriorate. A decision maker who
is genuinely uncertain about his environment might then seek improvement
in his performance for all possible decision environments rather than trading
off improvement in one environment against a reduction in performance in
another.
We assume that the decision maker measures his performance either in
terms of expected payoffs, or in terms of the expected probability of playing
the strategy that maximizes expected payoffs. The focus on expected payoffs
in our otherwise non-Bayesian model will appear surprising. To see why the
non-Bayesian decision maker might be interested in expected payoffs, decom-
pose the uncertainty facing the decision maker into two elements: (i) “What
is the environment?” and (ii) “Which payoffs will the decision maker receive
in any given environment?” In our paper, the decision maker is Bayesian with
respect to the second, but not with respect to the ﬁrst question, because the
second question involves less complexity, and therefore a Bayesian treatment
is less problematic, at least as a starting point for a study of boundedly rational
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Our main results provide some necessary and some sufﬁcient conditions for
absolute expediency and monotonicity. A necessary condition for both ab-
solute expediency and monotonicity is that the decision maker uses Cross’
(1973) learning rule, or a modiﬁed version of this learning rule.2 Cross’ rule
requires that the decision maker raise the probability of the strategy that he or
she chose in proportion to the payoffreceived, and that all other choice proba-
bilities be reduced proportionally. The modiﬁcations of this rule that are com-
patible with absolute expediency or monotonicity are learning rules in which
payoffs are subjected to certain afﬁne transformations before Cross’ rule is ap-
plied. The coefﬁcients of these transformations are allowed to depend on the
decision maker’s current mixed strategy, the strategy that he played, and the
strategy whose probability he is updating.3
We know from earlier work (Börgers and Sarin (1997)) that there is a close
connection between the expected movement of Cross’ learning model and the
replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. The necessary condition for
absolute expediency and monotonicity that we ﬁnd in this paper implies there-
fore an analogy between the expected movement of absolutely expedient or
monotone learning rules and the replicator dynamics. In the case in which
there are only two actions, the analogy is particularly tight: the expected move-
mentof action probabilitiesequals the replicator dynamics, rescaled with some
constant. The replicator dynamics and related evolutionary dynamics are often
used in economic or social contexts. Our results strengthen the case of the use
of replicator dynamics in contexts where learning is important.
Moving beyond necessary conditions, our next ﬁnding is that monotonic-
ity is a more restrictive property than absolute expediency.4 We show that all
monotone learning rules are absolutely expedient, and we give an example of
an absolutely expedient rule that is not monotone.
We have unfortunately not found a complete characterization of ab-
solutely expedient learning rules, but we do have a complete characteriza-
tion of monotone learning rules. We ﬁnd that the most important property of
monotone learning rules is that an increase in the payoff received with one
particular action can never make any of the other actions more likely. By con-
trast, we show by means of examples that absolutely expedient learning rules
can have the feature that the higher the payoff experienced with some action,
the higher is the probability of playing one of the other actions in the next pe-
riod. We interpret this as an implicit similarity relation between the concerned
2Cross’ learning model is in the tradition of the mathematical learning theory developed by
the psychologists Bush and Mosteller (1951).
3The effect of these transformations can be that the probability of the action played is lowered
if the payoff received is low, which is, somewhat implausibly, ruled out by Cross’ rule. An example
of a rule with this feature is mentioned in Proposition 4.
4Provided that there are at least three actions. If there are only two actions, then the two
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actions. Absolutely expedient learning rules thus can embody an implicit simi-
larity relation, but monotone learning rules cannot.
As there are relatively large sets of monotone,or absolutely expedient learn-
ing rules, one might ask: “Which of these rules is the best?” We shall call a
learning rule “best monotone” if, in all environments, it leads to at least as
large an expected increase in the probability of the best action as any other
monotone rule. Similarly, we shall call a learning rule “best absolutely expedi-
ent”if,inallenvironments,it leadsto alargerincrease inexpectedpayoffsthan
any other absolutely expedient rule. We show that for the case of two actions
there is a unique rule that is both best monotone and best absolutely expedi-
ent, but that in the case of more than two actions there is no best monotone,
and no best absolutely expedient rule.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework.
Section 3 deﬁnes the main concepts, absolute expediency and monotonicity.
Section 4 characterizes a property called “unbiasedness,” which is necessary
for both absolute expediency and monotonicity. Section 5 investigates which
additional features unbiased learning rules have to have if they are to be ab-
solutely expedient or monotone. Section 6 gives examples. Section 7 investi-
gates whether some absolutely expedient, or monotone learning rule can be
singled out as “best.” Finally, Section 8 discusses related literature.
2. MODEL
A decision maker chooses from a ﬁnite set S ={ s1 s 2     s n} of pure strate-
gies that has at least two elements. Every strategy si gives payoffs according to
a payoff distribution µi. We assume that there is some upper and some lower
bound for payoffs. For our paper it is then without loss of generality to assume
that the upper boundary is 1, and that the lower boundary is 0. In the follow-
ing deﬁnition an assignment of payoff distributions to strategies is called an
environment.
DEFINITION 1: An environment E is a collection (µi)i=1 2     n of probability
measures, each of which has support in the interval [0 1].
We shall be concerned with the decision maker’s behavior at two dates, “to-
day” and “tomorrow.” The environment is the same at these two dates. Payoffs
today are stochastically independent of payoffs tomorrow.
The decision maker knows the strategy set S, the bounds for payoffs, and
that his strategy set tomorrow is the same set as today. The decision maker
does not know the environment E. He chooses a strategy from S today, and
then observes the payoff realization. Tomorrow, he chooses a strategy from S
again.
The decision maker’s behavior today is described by a probability distribu-
tion σ = (σ1 σ 2     σ n) over S.Here, wedenoteby σi theprobabilityassignedLEARNING RULES 387
to pure strategy si.T h ed i s t r i b u t i o nσ describes how likely the decision maker
is to choose each of his strategies today.
The decision maker’s behavior today will be exogenousand ﬁxed. Ouranaly-
sis could form a building block for an analysis that includes a study of the opti-
mal initial point for the learning process. Alternatively, our analysis could also
be integrated into a study of learning algorithms that have the properties with
which we are concerned at every interior initial point.5
The decision maker’s behavior tomorrow is governed by a learning rule.
DEFINITION 2: A learning rule is a function L:S ×[0 1]→∆(S).
A learning rule determines as a function of the pure strategy si,w h i c ht h e
decision maker chooses today (and which is distributed according to σ), and
of the payoff that he receives today (which is distributed according to µi), how
likely each strategy is tomorrow. Denote by L(si x)(sj) the probability that the
decision maker’s mixed strategy tomorrow assigns to the pure strategy sj if the
decision maker plays today the pure strategy si and receives the payoff x.
One should think of the learning rule in Deﬁnition 2 as a “reduced form” of
the decision maker’s true learning rule. The true learning rule may, for exam-
ple, specify how the decision maker updates beliefs about the payoff distribu-
tions in response to his observations, and how these beliefs are translated into
behavior. If one combines the two steps ofbelief updatingand behavior adjust-
ment one arrives at a learning rule in the sense of Deﬁnition 2. Our approach
is therefore more general than an approach that focuses on learning rules in
which the state space of the learning rule is the strategy simplex ∆(S).
Throughout this paper we will make the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 1: For every i = 1 2     nthe probability σi is strictly positive.
If this assumption is violated, no learning rule can have the properties of ab-
solute expediency and monotonicity that we study below. To see this suppose
the environment were such that only strategies in some set C  = S were initially
played with positive probability. Consider environments in which i ∈ C implies
that µi assigns probability 1 to payoff x,a n di/ ∈ C implies that µi assigns prob-
ability 1 to payoff y  = x. In such environments, for any learning rule L,t h e
expected change in the probability of strategies is independent of the value
of y. But absolute expediency and monotonicity require that the total expected
5We need to refer here to interior initial points because of Assumption 1. Some learning rules
that we study in this paper have the property that extreme payoffs (0 or 1) in some period lead
the decision maker to adopt in the next period a mixed strategy that is not interior. Such learning
rules can then not always be applied repeatedly. However, such learning rules can be arbitrarily
closely approximated by learning rules that never take the decision maker outside of the interior
of the mixed strategy simplex. One simply has to multiply all changes in probabilities prescribed
by the learning rule by the factor 1−ε where ε∈ (0 1) can be arbitrarily close to zero.388 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
change in the probability of all strategies in C is negative if y>x ,a n dz e r oi f
x>y.
3. ABSOLUTE EXPEDIENCY AND MONOTONICITY
Our focus is on learning rules that guarantee for given initial state an im-
provementin the decisionmaker’s performancein every possible environment.
To formalize this property, we ﬁx some environment E. For any strategy si ∈ S
we denote the expected payoff of strategy si by πi.T h a ti s ,πi =
  1
0 xdµ i.
The set of expected payoff maximizing strategies is denoted by S∗,t h a ti s ,
S∗ ={ si ∈ S|πi ≥ πj for all j = 1 2     n}. To keep our notation simple, we
suppress the dependence of πi and S∗, and of related variables below, on E.
Now ﬁx a learning rule L. For every strategy si denote by f(s i) the expected










We extend the deﬁnition of f to subsets ˜ S of S by setting: f(˜ S)=
 
si∈˜ S f(s i) 





Of course, f and g depend on the learning rule L, but, to keep things simple,
we suppress that dependencein ournotation.Note that we also donotindicate
the dependence of f and g on σ. This is because throughout the paper σ will
be exogenous and ﬁxed, as explained in Section 2.
We can now deﬁne the property of learning rules which is the focus of this
paper.
DEFINITION 3: A learning rule L is absolutely expedient if for all environ-
ments E with S∗  = S we have g>0 
In words, a learning rule is absolutely expedient if in all nontrivial environ-
ments expected payoffsare on average strictly higher tomorrowthan today. An
environment is “nontrivial” if S∗  = S  If S∗ = S  all strategies are optimal and
nothing needs to be learned. If S∗  = S, then there is scope for improvement
in the decision maker’s performance because, by Assumption 1, the decision
maker assigns some positive probability to nonoptimal strategies.
A second formalization of the notion of “improvement” in the decision
maker’s performance requires that the probability assigned to the best actions
increases in all nontrivial environments.LEARNING RULES 389
DEFINITION 4: A learning rule L is monotone if for all environments E with
S∗  = S we have f(S∗)>0 
The relation between monotonicity and absolute expediency will be studied
below. However, the following observation is obvious.
REMARK 1: If n = 2, then a learning rule L is absolutely expedient if and
only if it is monotone.
At this point we brieﬂy remark on a subtle technical point.
REMARK2: Whileit is without loss of generality to take the upper and lower
boundaries on payoffs to be zero and one, in the light of Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 it
is not quite without loss of generality to let the set of possible payoffs be the
closed interval [0 1], as we did in Deﬁnition 1, rather than the open interval
(0 1) (or a half-open interval). Our assumption that the set of payoffs is [0 1],
in combination with Deﬁnitions 3 and 4, implies that when checking absolute
expediency or monotonicity one needs to consider (among others) environ-
ments in which the upper or the lower boundary for payoffs are attained. If we
had considered the (half-)open interval, then these environments would have
been ruled out. Our proofs can easily be modiﬁed to cover the case in which
t h ei n t e r v a lo fp o s s i b l ep a y o f f si st a k e nt ob e( h a l f - ) o p e n .
We end this section with an example of a learning rule due to Cross (1973).
In the next section we shall show that all absolutely expedient or monotone
learning rules have a structure that is similar to the structure of Cross’ learning
rule.
EXAMPLE 1: For all i j ∈{ 1 2     n} with i  = j,a n df o ra l lx ∈[ 0 1],
L(si x)(si) = σi +(1−σi)x 
L(sj x)(si) = σi −σix 
In words, if the decision maker plays strategy si and obtains payoff x,t h e nh e
increases the probability of si, and the size of the increase is proportional to x.
If x = 1, then the decision makersets theprobability of si equalto one.If x = 0,
he leaves the probability of si unchanged. The probability of all other strategies
is reduced so as to keep the sum of all probabilities equal to one, and to leave
the ratios between the other probabilities unchanged. Notice that this learning
rule has the somewhat counterintuitive feature that the decision maker always
increases the probability of the strategy that he actually played, even if the
payoff was very low. Not all absolutely expedient or monotone learning rules
have this feature, as an example in Proposition 4 below shows.390 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
We now show that Cross’ learning rule is absolutely expedient and mono-
tone. The expected movement of the probability of any particular pure strategy
si under Cross’ rule is







for all i = 1 2     n.
This equation shows that the expected change in the probability of any pure
strategy si is proportional to the difference between that strategy’s expected
payoff, and the expected value of the expected payoff of the pure strategy
played today. The condition S∗  = S and Assumption 1 imply that for strategies
in S∗ the difference between their expected payoff and the expected value of
the expected payoff of the pure strategy played today is strictly positive. Thus
the above equation shows that Cross’ rule is monotone.
Note that the right-hand side of the equation for f(s i) i st h es a m ea st h e
right-hand of the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory, which de-
scribes how proportionsof differentstrategies in a populationmove if the pop-
ulation is subject to evolutionary selection. The connection between Cross’
learning model and the replicator dynamics was explored further in Börgers
and Sarin (1997).












The right-hand side is the variance of the expected payoff of the pure strat-
egy chosen today. How can an expected value have a variance? The decision
maker’s pure strategy today is a random variable. Thus, also the expected pay-
off associated with that pure strategy is a random variable. The right-hand side
is the variance of that random variable. Observe that S∗  = S and Assumption 1
imply that this variance is strictly positive. Thus we have shown that Cross’ rule
is absolutely expedient.
4. UNBIASEDNESS
In a ﬁrst step we study a property that we call unbiasedness.
DEFINITION 5: A learning rule L is unbiased if for all environments E with
S∗ = S we have f(s i) = 0 for every i = 1 2     n 
In words this deﬁnition says that a learning rule is unbiased if the expected
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the same expected payoff. If in such an environment some strategies’ probabil-
ities increased in expected terms, and some other strategies’ probabilities de-
creased, then the learning rule would implicitly “favor” the former strategies.
This is why we refer to the property as “unbiasedness.”
The next lemma shows that unbiasedness is necessary for absolute expedi-
ency and monotonicity.6
LEMMA 1: Every absolutely expedient and every monotone learning rule is un-
biased.
PROOF:L e tL be a biased learning rule. Consider an environment E such
that S = S∗,a n d ,f o rs o m es t r a t e g ysi ∈ S,w eh a v e :f(s i)<0. Now we shall
construct a new environment by making a small change in the payoff distribu-
tion of si, leaving all other strategies’ payoff distributions unchanged. We ﬁrst
consider the case that there is some x in the support of µi such that x<1. We
now reduce the probability that µi attaches to x by some ε>0, and assign the
probability ε instead to some payoff x+α where 0 <α<1−x. In the new en-
vironment, strategy si is the unique best strategy. The expected movement of
the probability assigned to si is continuous in ε.F o rs u f ﬁ c i e n t l ys m a l lε,t h e r e -
fore, the expected change in the probability of si is negative in the modiﬁed
environment, as it was in the original environment. This contradicts absolute
expediency and monotonicity. It remains to deal with the case that the support
of si is the singleton 1. Because S∗ = S, all other probability distributions µj
must also assign probability 1 to the payoff 1. Because the expected movement
in the probability of si is negative, there must be at least some other strategy
sj such that the expected movement in sj’s probability is positive. Replace the
payoff distribution for that strategy by a distribution that assigns some positive
probability ε>0 to some payoff less than 1, instead of 1. If ε is sufﬁciently
small, the expected movement in the probability of sj will be positive. This
contradicts absolute expediency and monotonicity. Q.E.D.
Our strategy is to characterize unbiased learning rules, andthen to ask which
additional conditions absolutely expedient or monotone learning rules have to
satisfy. The proof of the following proposition is in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: Al e a r n i n gr u l eL is unbiased if and only if there are matrices
(Aij)i j=1 2     n and (Bij)i j=1 2     n such that for every (si x)∈ S ×[0 1],
L(si x)(si) = σi +(1−σi)(Aii +Biix)  (1)
L(sj x)(si) = σi −σi(Aji +Bjix) for all j  = i  (2)
6In previous versions of this paper, we assumed that the learning rule was continuous in pay-
offs, and we used this assumption to prove Lemma 1. We are grateful to Jeff Ely for comments
that induced us to reinvestigate whether we really needed the continuity assumption.392 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN









Thus, a learning rule is unbiased if and only if the decision maker, after play-
ing his action and receiving his payoff, ﬁrst submits the payoff to an afﬁne
transformation and then applies Cross’ rule. The coefﬁcients of this afﬁne
transformation are allowed to depend on the strategy that he has played and
on the strategy whose probability he isadjusting. Conditions(3) and (4) restrict
the coefﬁcients of the afﬁne transformation. They require that the coefﬁcients
of the afﬁne transformation that are applied when si was played and si is up-
dated are the expected values (over j) of the coefﬁcients that are used when sj
was played and si is updated.
The key feature of the learning rules in Proposition 1 is that they are linear
in payoffs. Very informally speaking the intuition why linearity is necessary
for unbiasedness is that expected payoffs are a linear function of payoffs. The
linearity of the expected payoff function must be reﬂected in the linearity of an
unbiased learning rule.
The following remarks follow from Proposition 1 through elementary calcu-
lations.
REMARK 3: Let L satisfy the characterization in Proposition 1, and let E be
an environment. Then for all si ∈ S the expected change of the probability of si
is given by



















These two formulas reduce to the analogous formulas for the Cross model
in the previous section if all the coefﬁcients Bij equal one. This is evident for
the ﬁrst formula, which is reminiscent of the replicator dynamics. The second
formula reduces in the case that all the coefﬁcients equal one to the difference
between the expected value of the square of πi and the square of the expected
value of πi,w h i c hi s ,o fc o u r s e ,t h ev a r i a n c e .LEARNING RULES 393
REMARK 4: Suppose n = 2. Then the conditions in Proposition 1 can be
satisﬁed only if there are constants A and B such that Aij = A and Bij = B for
all i j = 1 2. This follows from straightforward calculations. Substituting this
into the formulas in Remark 3, we ﬁnd that for n = 2 the expected movement
of an unbiased learning process is exactly equal to the replicator dynamics,
multiplied by the factor B.
5. OWN AND CROSS EFFECTS
Next, we ask which additional conditions, beyond those in Proposition 1,
learning rules satisfy if they are absolutely expedientor monotonic.Notice that
Remark 3 indicates that it is the coefﬁcients (Bji)i j=1 2     n that matter for the
expected movement of the probability of expected payoffs and of the probabil-
ity of playing one of the best strategies. Therefore, our investigation will focus
on these coefﬁcients.
We ﬁrst note that if there are onlytwo actions it is immediatefromRemark 4
how we can characterize absolutely expedient or monotone rules.
REMARK 5: Suppose n = 2. Then a learning rule L is absolutely expedient
(equivalently: monotone) if and only if Bij > 0f o ri j = 1 2.
We now turn to the general case of two or more actions.
DEFINITION 6: A learning rule L is own-positive if Bii > 0f o ra l li =
1 2     n 
This property means that the probability that the decision maker plays to-
morrow the strategy that he played today increases in the payoff that the deci-
sion maker received today. The following result shows that the learning rules
that we study in this paper are own-positive.
PROPOSITION 2: Every absolutely expedient or monotone learning rule is own-
positive.
PROOF:L e tL be absolutely expedient or monotone. Consider an environ-
ment in which all actions have the same expected payoff x<1. By Proposi-
tion 1, f(s i) = 0f o ra l li = 1 2     n  Now add some ε>0 to the expected
payoff of some strategy si. It is easy to calculate from the formulas in the proof
of Proposition 1 that in this new environment f(s i) = σi(1 − σi)Biiε. Clearly
f(s i) has to be positive if L is absolutely expedient or monotone. This requires
that Bii > 0. This holds for all i. Q.E.D.
The above proposition shows that own-positivity is necessary for absolute
expediency or monotonicity. However, it turns out that it is not sufﬁcient. We
introduce a further, more restrictive property.394 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
DEFINITION 7: A learning rule L is cross-negative if:
(i) Bji ≥ 0f o ra l li j ∈{ 1 2     n} with i  = j; and
(ii) if C is a subset of S such that C  =∅ ,a n dS \ C  =∅ , then there are
strategies si ∈ C,a n dsj ∈ S \C such that Bji > 0.
Condition (i) in this deﬁnition means that if the decision maker played a
strategy sj today, then the probability that he plays a different strategy si to-
morrow is nonincreasing in the payoff that he received today. This rules out
that the decision maker regards si as “similar” to sj, and therefore treats a
success today with sj as encouraging news also for si.
Cross-negativity allows for the possibility that some cross effects are null, i.e.
that the size of the payoff received today has no impact on the probability with
which some other strategy is played tomorrow. However, not all cross-effects
can be null. This is implied by condition (ii). Condition (ii) means that when-
ever one partitions S into two subsets, then one can ﬁnd a pair of strategies,
one from each subset, such that the cross effect is strictly negative.
A simple inspection of condition (4) in Proposition 1 shows that cross-
negativity implies own-positivity but not vice versa (except when the number
of actions is 2).
It may seem plausible that cross-negativity is necessary for absolute expedi-
ency or monotonicity. Our decision maker is ignorant about his environment,
and thus one might think that a learning rule must not have built in similarity
relations. It turns out that this intuition is only partially correct.
PROPOSITION 3: (i) A learning rule is monotone if and only if it is cross-
negative. (ii) Every cross-negative rule is absolutely expedient.
The proof of part (i) is simple and transparent, but the proof of part (ii) is
more involved. Therefore, part (ii) is proved in the Appendix.
PROOF: We will ﬁnd it convenient to work with the following expression
for the expected change in the probability attached to any action si.T h i se x -
pression can be obtained by inserting condition (4) of Proposition 1 into the
formula of Remark 3.




σjBji(πi −πj) for all i = 1 2     n  (5)
Sufﬁciency proof for part (i): Consider an environment E with S∗  = S and any
strategy si ∈ S∗.I fL is cross-negative then all the expressions in the sum on the
right-hand side of equation (5) are nonnegative. Moreover, condition (ii) in
the deﬁnition of cross-negativity ensures that there exist si ∈ S∗ and sj ∈ S∗ \ SLEARNING RULES 395
such that Bji > 0, and hence the expected change in the probability with which
strategy si is played is strictly positive. Thus we can conclude that f(S∗)>0.
Necessity proof for part (i): Suppose that L is monotone. We begin by prov-
ing that it has to satisfy condition (i) in the deﬁnition of cross-negativity. Our
proof is indirect. Suppose there were j i ∈{ 1 2     n} with j  = i such that
Bji < 0. Consider an environment E such that si yields payoff x with proba-
bility 1, sj yields payoff x − δ with probability 1, and all other strategies sk (if
any) yield payoff x − ε with probability 1. Here we assume δ ε > 0. Then,
equation (5) implies












If Bji < 0, then this expression becomes negative when ε is sufﬁciently close to
zero, which contradicts monotonicity.
Next we prove that L has to satisfy condition (ii) in the deﬁnition of cross-
negativity. The proof is indirect. Suppose there were some subset C of S such
that C  =∅and S \ C  =∅and such that Bji = 0f o ra l lsi ∈ C and sj ∈ S \ C.
Consider an environment E such that all strategies in C yield payoff x with
certainty, and all strategies in S \C yield payoff y<xwith certainty. Using the
same formula as before it is immediate that f(s)= 0 for all strategies in C,a n d
hence that the rule is not monotone. Q.E.D.
The above proposition leaves the question open whether absolutely expe-
d i e n tr u l e se x i s tt h a ta r en o tm o n o t o n e .S u c hr u l e sm u s ti n c l u d ea tl e a s to n e
positive cross-effect. This means that a notion of similarity of two strategies
is built into the learning rule. But, in the true environment, these strategies
might not be similar at all. Even in such environments the rule must improve
expected payoffs. In the next section we shall give an example of such a rule.
6. EXAMPLES
We begin with an example of an absolutely expedient rule that is not
monotone. In this rule n = 3, and the current mixed strategy is the uniform
distribution. Intuitively, the rule treats actions 1 and 2 as similar. In an earlier
version of the paper we have shown how this example can be extended to the
case n>3, and to the case of arbitrary initial state. The details are available
from the authors. We omit the straightforward calculation which shows that
this rule is absolutely expedient.396 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN








for all i ∈{ 1 2 3} 




Bi3 = B3i =
3
10
for all i ∈{ 1 2 3} 
At this stage one may wonder whether all own-positive rules are absolutely
expedient. This is not the case. Suppose that there are n = 3 actions, and that
the decision maker applies Cross’ rule with the following modiﬁcation: If s1 or
s2 have been played and a payoff x has been received, then the decision maker
applies Cross’ rule to the joint probability of s1 and s2, and moreover keeps
the relative probabilities of these two strategies unchanged. This rule is own-
positive. Now consider an environment in which the expected payoff of strate-
giess1 and s2 taken together equals theexpectedpayoffof s3: σ1π1+σ2π2 = π3,
but in which π1 >π 2. Then in expected terms no strategy’s probability will
change, and therefore also the expected payoff will stay the same. However,
absolute expediency requires it to increase.
Our ﬁnal example shows how the results can be used to assess whether
a learning rule is monotone or absolutely expedient. The rule that we con-
sider is due to Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth (1998). Their learning
rule has the state space V = R
n
>0 with generic element v = (v1 v 2     v n).T h e
vector v describes the decision maker’s “inclination”to play any of his n strate-
gies. The decision maker’s mixed strategy is proportional to v.A f t e rp l a y i n g
strategy si and receiving payoff x, the decision maker adds x to the inclination
of playing si, leaving all other inclinations unchanged. The following formulae
describe the implied change in the strategy probabilities.
EXAMPLE 3: The Roth–Erev learning rule is given by









σix for all j  = i 
Note that this learning rule is Cross’ Rule, except that the direction of the
movement is multiplied by 1/(
 n
k=1vk + x). The learning rule is not linear inLEARNING RULES 397
payoffsbecause x appears in the denominator. Therefore, according to Propo-
sition 1, it is not unbiased and, according to Lemma 1, it is neither monotone
nor absolutely expedient.
7. BEST LEARNING RULES
We have found a large set of monotone learning rules, and a larger set of ab-
solutely expedient learning rules. Is any of these learning rules “best”? A nat-
ural deﬁnition of “best” in the context of monotonicity is that the expected
increase in the probability of playing the best actions is maximized in all envi-
ronments. A natural deﬁnition of “best” in the context of absolute expediency
is that the increase in expected payoffs is maximized in all environments.
DEFINITION 8: Given an initial state σ al e a r n i n gr u l eL is called best
monotone for σ if it is monotone, and if for every other monotone learning
rule L  and for every environment E we have: f(S∗) ≥ f  (S∗),w h e r ef(S∗) is
the expected change in the probability of the expected payoff maximizing ac-
tions if L is used, and f  (S∗) is the expected change in the probability of the
expected payoff maximizing actions if L  is used.
Al e a r n i n gr u l eL is called best absolutely expedient for σ if it is absolutely
expedient, and if for every other absolutely expedient learning rule L  and for
every environment E we have: g ≥ g ,w h e r eg is the expected change in ex-
pected payoffs if L is used, and g  is the expected change in expected payoffs if
L  is used.
I nt h ec a s et h a tt h e r ea r et w oa c t i o n so n l y ,al e a r n i n gr u l ei so b v i o u s l yb e s t
absolutely expedient if and only if it is best monotone, and it is sufﬁcient to
focus on best monotone rules. The following proposition characterizes for this
case the best monotone rule.
PROPOSITION 4: Let n = 2  and consider a ﬁxed initial state (σ1 σ 2). Then








for i j ∈{ 1 2} 
PROOF: Recall from Remark 4 that in the case n = 2 conditions (3) and (4)
of Proposition 1 imply that all coefﬁcients in the A matrix in Proposition 1
have to be identical, and all coefﬁcients in the B matrix have to be identical:
Aij = A for i j ∈{ 1 2} and Bij = B for i j ∈{ 1 2}. The expected change in the
probability of strategy si is
f(s i) = Bσi[πi −(σ1π1 +σ2π2)] 398 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
Thus, the best monotone learning rule is the one for which B is largest. The
admissible values for A and B are those for which, for any payoff value x,
the formula for updating the probability of strategies yields a value in [0 1].
A simple calculation shows that among all admissible values of A and B the
one indicated in Proposition 4 has the highest value of B. Q.E.D.
REMARK 6: Note that the best monotone learning rule incorporates an en-
dogenous aspiration level. To see this note that the probability of playing the
same action tomorrow as was played today is given by
L(si x)(si) = σi +(1−σi)
1
max{σ1 σ 2}
(x−min{σ1 σ 2}) 
Thus, the probability min{σ1 σ 2} serves as an aspiration level. If the payoff
received is below this probability, then the probability of playing the action is
reduced. Otherwise, it is increased. The aspiration level is the higher the closer
together the probabilities of the two strategies.7
REMARK 7: Several rules singled out by Schlag (2002) as having good prop-
erties induce the same behavior as the rule that Proposition 4 identiﬁes as the




2). Schlag’s work is restricted




2). Proposition9 of Schlag (2002)
lists properties of rules that are “closest to ideal” (i.e. minimize some measure
of regret) among all ex-ante improving rules (see Section 8 for an explanation
of this term). One property that is listed is that the strategy that was played in
period 1 is repeated in period 2 with a probability that is equal to x,t h ep a y -
off received. This is exactly the same as the best monotone learning rule that





best monotone rule chooses A =− 1a n dB = 2. This implies L(si x)(si) = x.
We now move to the case of more than two actions. We show that in the
simplest possible circumstances, three actions and uniforminitial state, there is
no best monotone learning rule, and also no best absolutely expedientlearning
rule. We have not generalized this result to more than three actions, or other
initial states. But our result suggests that the chances of ﬁnding best learning
rules in general are slim. The proof of the following result is in the Appendix.







No best monotone learning rule and no best absolutely expedient learning rule
exists for this initial state.
7A different learning rule with endogenous aspiration level was studied in Börgers and Sarin
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Even though there is no best rule in the case n ≥ 3, some rules might achieve
in all environments a larger increase in expected payoff or the probability of
the best strategies than other rules. We leave it to future research to investigate
such “dominance” relations among learning rules.
8. RELATED LITERATURE
Schlag (1994) and Sarin (1995) study axioms for learning rules, among them
absolute expediency. Because they add other axioms and assumptions to ab-
solute expediency, they characterize a smaller class of learning rules than our
paper. Schlag (1994) assumes that the rule is afﬁne in payoffs and that the co-
efﬁcients of the transformation of payoffs do not depend on the current mixed
strategy. Sarin (1995) assumes that the rule by which the probability of an un-
chosenactionisupdateddependsonlyonthe payoffreceived, notontheaction
chosen. He also assumes a form of multiplicative separability of the learning
rule.
A more recent paper by Schlag (2002) considers the case of two actions
only. Schlag assumes that payoffsare identically and independentlydistributed
in all time periods, and that the decision maker uses the same learning rule
throughout. He calls learning rules “ex ante improving” if expected payoffs are
monotonically increasing from each period to the next, where, expected val-
ues are taken unconditionally, i.e. before period 1 begins. Contrast this with
absolute expediency in our paper. If a decision maker uses repeatedly an ab-
solutely expedient rule,8 then expected payoffs increase from each period to
the next, not just in ex ante terms, but also in interim terms, i.e. if expected
change in expected payoffs is calculated conditional on the mixed strategy at
the beginning of each period. Schlag does not aim for a complete characteriza-
tionof“exanteimproving”rules, buthe selects amongthe “exante improving”
rules those that are “best” according to further criteria. The rule that he then
obtains is the same as the rule that we obtain as the “best” absolutely expedient
rule in the case of two actions and uniform initial state.9
Schlag(2002)alsoconsidersabsolute expediencyas deﬁnedinthis paper.He
indicates that this property is in conﬂict with other desirable long-run proper-
ties, if attention is restricted to learning rules with small ﬁnite state space.10
A large set of papers related to ours can be found in the literature on ma-
chine learning, and speciﬁcally in the part that is concerned with the learning
8Recall from footnote 5 that some of the absolutely expedient learning rules considered in this
paper cannot be used repeatedly, but that such rules can be closely approximated by rules that
can be iterated.
9See Remark 7 in Section 7.
10See part (iii) of Proposition 5 (where the state space of the learning rule is assumed to be of
cardinality 2) and part (ii) of Proposition 7 in Schlag (2002) (where the state space of the learning
rule is assumed to be of cardinality 4).400 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
behavior of stochastic automata.11 In this literature, absolute expediency was
originally deﬁned by Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1973). Monotonicity is
studied by Toyama and Kimura (1977) who refer to it as absolute adaptability.
The most general characterization of absolutely expedient learning rules
in this literature of which we are aware is Theorem 6.1 in Narendra and
Thathachar (1989). This result characterizes absolutely expedient learning
rules assuming that the updating rule is afﬁne in payoffs, and that the coefﬁ-
cients in the afﬁne transformation of payoffsdepend only on the action played,
but noton the strategy whose probabilityis updated.Narendra and Thathachar
also show that in their framework absolute expediency and monotonicity are
equivalent.12
Toyama and Kimura (1977) characterize monotone learning rules. Like
Narendra and Thathachar they assume linearity of the learning rule in payoffs
whereas we derive it. They allow the coefﬁcients of the payoff transformation
to depend on the current state, but neither on the action that has been played
nor on the action that is updated. Their results are implied by ours.13
Absolute expediency and monotonicity are also closely related to properties
of “selection dynamics” studied in evolutionary game theory. These dynamics
describe the evolution of the proportions of players playing different strategies
in large populations. The analogue of absolute expediency in the evolutionary
literature is weak compatibility as deﬁned by Friedman (1991). Weak compati-
bility requires that the average populationpayoff increase over time. Friedman
studies implications of weak compatibility but does not provide a characteriza-
tion of weakly compatible evolutionary dynamics. It may be possible to adapt
our results to an evolutionary setting, but we have not pursued this.
The closest analogue of monotonicity in the evolutionary literature is payoff
monotonicity, which requires that the ordering of growth rates of the propor-
tions of a population playing different strategies be the same as the ordering
of expected payoffs. The evolutionary literature does not contain character-
izations of the functional form of selection dynamics with these properties.
Samuelson and Zhang’s (1992) aggregate monotonicity is more restrictive than
payoff monotonicity in that the requirement applies not only to pure but also
to mixed strategies. Samuelson and Zhang, like us, ﬁnd a connection between
monotonicity and the replicator dynamics. They show that a selection dynam-
ics satisﬁes aggregate monotonicity if and only if it is equivalent to replicator
dynamics with linearly transformed payoffs. Their result is obtained by con-
11A useful overview of the literature on stochastic automata and learning has been provided
by Narendra and Thathachar (1989), in particular Chapter 6.
12Narendraand Thathachar’sassumptions about the form of the learning rule imply that every
unbiased rule that is of this form must be cross-negative (using the terminology of this paper that
is introducedbelow). Thus,our Propositions 3and4imply theequivalenceof absolute expediency
and monotonicity in Narendra and Thathachar’s framework.
13Note that our results imply that in their framework monotonicity and absolute expediency
are actually equivalent.LEARNING RULES 401
sidering a single environment only, while it is essential for our results that a
learning rule must operate in multiple environments.
Our work is also related to Schlag’s (1998) work on imitation. He considers
decision makers who observe the choices and payoffs of other decision makers
facing the same environment. For the case of two actions Schlag characterizes
imitation rules that ensure an increase in expected payoffs,averaged across the
population. He ﬁnds that the imitation probability is proportional to payoffs,
and that the resulting population dynamics is a rescaled version of the replica-
tor dynamics.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Sufﬁciency:I fS∗ = S,i . e .i ft h e r ei ss o m ex such that πi = x for all
i = 1 2     n, then the formula for f(s i) in Remark 3 becomes







for i =1 2     n 
By condition (4) in Proposition 1 the term in big brackets equals zero, and thus f(s i) = 0f o ra l l
i = 1 2     n 
Necessity: We proceed in three steps.
Step 1: If L is unbiased, then for all sj s i ∈ S the function L(sj x)(si) is afﬁne in x.
PROOF:L e t L be an unbiased learning rule, and consider two environments, E and   E.I ne n -
vironment E all strategies receive some payoff x with 0 <x≤ 1 with certainty. In environment   E
some strategy sj ∈ S receives payoff 1 with probability x, and payoff 0 with probability 1−x.
All other strategies receive again payoff x with certainty. Both environments are then such that
all strategies have the same expected payoff. Therefore, unbiasedness requires that in both en-
vironments the expected change in the probability assigned to any strategy si is zero. Denoting
by f(s i) expected changes in probabilities in environment E,a n db y ˜ f(s i) expected changes in402 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
probabilities in environment   E  we obtain thus for arbitrary strategy si ∈ S:
f(s i) = σjL(sj x)(si)+
n  
k=1 k =j
σkL(sk x)(si)−σi = 0 
  f(s i) = σjxL(sj 1)(si)+σj(1−x)L(sj 0)(si)+
n  
k=1 k =j
σkL(sk x)(si)−σi =0 
Subtracting these two equations from each other yields
σjL(sj x)(si)−σjxL(sj 1)(si)−σj(1−x)L(sj 0)(si) = 0 
Dividing by σj and rearranging one obtains





Thus we have concluded that L(sj x)(si) is an afﬁne function of x. Note that our argument is
true for arbitrary pairs of strategies sj and si 
Step 2: If the function L(sj x)(si) is afﬁne in x,t h e ni tc a nb ew r i t t e ni nt h ef o r ma s s e r t e di n
Proposition 1.
PROOF: Consider ﬁrst the case j = i.W ec a nw r i t et h ef o r m u l af o rL(si x)(si) in Proposition
1a s :σi + (1 − σi)Aii + (1 − σi)Biix. Now recall the last equation in Step 1. Clearly, we can
choose Aii such that σi +(1−σi)Aii = L(si 0)(si), and we can choose Bii such that (1−σi)Bii =
(L(si 1)(si) − L(si 0)(si)). The last equation in Step 1 then shows that with these deﬁnitions
L(si x)(si) has the form asserted in Proposition 1. For L(sj x)(si) where j  = i we can proceed
analogously.
Step 3: The coefﬁcients have to satisfy the restrictions (3) and (4).
PROOF: Suppose that all actions give the same deterministic payoff x. Then the expected
change in the probability of strategy si can be calculated using formulas (1) and (2) in Propo-
sition 1. One obtains

















This expression has to be zero for all x ∈[ 0 1]. This can only be true if both expressions in big
round brackets equal zero. This is what conditions (3) and (4) require. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PART (ii) OF PROPOSITION 3: Let L be a monotone learning rule. We will prove
the assertion by induction over the number of different expected payoffs available in the environ-
m e n t ,i . e .o v e r {x ∈[ 0 1]|πi = x for some i = 1 2     n}  We will begin with the case that this











Now suppose we had shown the assertion for all environments E with  {x ∈[ 0 1]|πi = x for
some i = 1 2     n}=ν − 1  and consider an environment E such that  {x ∈[ 0 1]|πi = x for
some i = 1 2     n}=ν. Denote the set of all strategies with the lowest expected payoff levelLEARNING RULES 403
by S. Denote the corresponding expected payoff level by π  Denote the set of all strategies with
the second lowest expected payoff level by   S. Denote the corresponding expected payoff level
by   π  Deﬁne k ≡   π − π and note that k>0. Consider a modiﬁed environment in which the
expected payoff of all strategies in S is raised to   π. Denote the expected change of payoffs in this
modiﬁed environment by g . By the inductive assumption we know that g  > 0. We shallnow show
that g −g  >0. This then obviously implies the claim.
To calculate g −g  we denote for every si ∈ S by f  (si) the expected change in the probability

















































































We will prove that the above expression is positive. The ﬁrst term in this difference is evidently
strictly positive, because L is monotone (i.e. Bji ≥ 0), πi > π and k>0. It remains to prove
that
 
sj∈S f  (sj)<0. But this is true because cross-negativity implies that the expected change
in the probability of the set of worst strategies is strictly negative. The proof is analogous to the
sufﬁciency proof of part (i) of Proposition 3. We conclude that g −g  > 0, as required. Q.E.D.404 T. BÖRGERS, A. MORALES, AND R. SARIN
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: No best monotone rule exists: Our proof is indirect. Let L∗ be a






3). It has to attain the largest expected
gain in the probability of the best actions for every environment. In particular, this has to be true
for environments with πi >π j = πk,f o ri j k = 1 2 3a n di  = j k. For these environments, the





This is largest if Bii is largest. As in the proof of Proposition 4, it is easy to verify that the set of
admissible values for Bii has a strictly positive upper bound. Let B denote this upper bound. As
the argument applies to arbitrary i,w ec o n c l u d et h a tBii = B for every i ∈{ 1 2 3}.
This result, together with condition (4) of Proposition 1, and with the restrictions for the
(Bij)-matrix implied by the fact that updated learning probabilities have to add up to one, implies
that the matrix of Bij-coefﬁcients must be of the following form (where we denote the coefﬁ-


























Now suppose π1 >π 2 >π 3. Then the above expression becomes larger as b gets larger. On the
other hand, if π1 >π 3 >π 2, then the above expression becomes larger as b gets smaller. Thus,
no value of b maximizes the above expression in all environments. This contradicts the existence
of a best monotone learning rule L∗.
No best absolutely expedient rule exists: Like the proof in the ﬁrst part, also this proof is indirect.
Using the same arguments as in the ﬁrst part, one shows that the matrix (Bij) has to have the
form derived in the ﬁrst part.
















Note that this is independent of b. Thus, if there is any best absolutely expedient learning rule,
then all learning rules with a (Bij)-matrix that is of the form derived above will be best absolutely
e x p e d i e n t .O n ep o s s i b l ec h o i c ef o rb is: b = B. This is the choice on which we focus. With this
choice of b it follows that Bij = B for all i j = 1 2 3.
Now let δ satisfy 0 <δ<
B












This matrix satisﬁes the restrictions of Proposition 1. All entries of this matrix are strictly positive.
Therefore, this rule is monotone and hence absolutely expedient. With this rule, the expectedLEARNING RULES 405

























+2(B +δ)π1π3 +2(B −δ)π2π3
 
 






(π1 −π2)(π2 −π3) 
Clearly, if π1  = π2 and π2  = π3, this derivative is not equal to zero. Thus, either by raising δ,o r
by lowering it, a higher value of the expected change in expected payoffs can be achieved. This
contradicts the assumption that the learning rule that we are considering, which corresponds to
the case δ = 0, is best absolutely expedient. Q.E.D.
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